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Abstract 
This research intends to analyze of Poland’s energy policy and its change of paradigm 
in the EU integration framework.  
Energetically, it was an integration that made sense and was fruitful for both sides, since 
Poland was able to adapt to new rules as an EU member and, as a consequence, external 
capital flows entered the country providing the much needed investment to rebuild the 
economy. This economic/energetic links are interlaced (as the research will explore) on 
every market and on every branch of them; renewable energy sources became a priority, 
despite the country heavy reliance on fossil fuels. Actually, EU membership forced 
Poland to a deep reshaping of its energy sector.  
Poland not only grew economically and retransformed its energy but was also able to 
exercise its influence diplomatically by trying to rush an energy policy at a European 
level. This policy of an integrated European energy market is perhaps its biggest goal 
and will be probably its main achievement as a European Union partner. The paths for 
this country is clear, to assume itself as leader inside European diplomacy. 
Keywords: Poland; Energy; Policy; RES; European Union. 
  
 
 
Resumo 
Esta investigação pretende analisar a politica energética da Polónia e a mudança de 
paradigma da mesma na intergração europeia. 
Energeticamente, foi uma integração que fez todo o sentido e que obteve resultados 
positivos em ambos os lados; desde então, a Polónia foi capaz de se adaptar às novas 
regras Europeias e como consequência disso, capitais externos fluíram para o país 
fornecendo o até então muito necessitado investimento para reconstruir a economia. 
Esta ligação economia/energia está interligada (como a pesquisa vai detalhar) em todos 
os mercados e em todos os sectores destes; as energias renováveis desde então, 
tornaram-se uma prioridade apesar da ainda larga dependência nos combustíveis fósseis. 
A integração na EU forçou a Polónia a uma transformação do seu sector energético. 
A Polónia não só cresceu economicamente e transformação a sua energia mas foi 
também capaz de exercer a sua influência diplomaticamente ao tentar apressar uma 
politica energética ao nível europeu. Esta politica de integração do mercado energético 
Europeu é talvez o maior objectivo da Polónia e seria talvez a sua maior conquista como 
membro da União Europeia. Os caminhos para este país estão assim traçados, o de se 
assumir como líder dentro da diplomacia europeia. 
Palavras-chave: Polónia; Energia; Politica; Energias renováveis; União Europeia.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This dissertation, “Poland’s energy policy: a contribution” is a reflection of Poland’s 
energy market reforms since the democratic transition period of the early 1990’s but, 
also focus on the post European Union membership period. 
This research was developed as part of the Master Degree in Environmental Economics 
and Management for the Economics Faculty of Porto (FEP) in order to achieve the 
respective degree. 
Following my interest on Polish culture, history and more, the opportunity for 
approaching a topic from Poland for a research seemed a great opportunity not only to 
expand my source of knowledge about the country but also to give some perspective of 
a thematic that isn’t a widely researched topic in my home country of Portugal.   
On this globalized world, economic relations are primordial to understand each nation; 
on this perspective, energy economics are even more important to understand the role of 
strategies, opportunities and adaptability that each nation faces now and will face on the 
future. 
The international context also held a big influence in choosing this topic; the 
unfortunate conflict in East Ukraine poses new questions that have to be answered and 
Poland is on the center of it when it comes to decisions since the country is and needs to 
assume its role as bridge between the West and the East by reshaping itself as a regional 
power. 
This new need of a balance of power affects Poland energy policy and since the 1990’s 
it has been evolving in order to “catch” some western countries. This evolution can be 
assumed by the will of the Polish to join the European Union and therefore the need to 
comply with its rules. 
The European process has been the great power behind Poland’s restructuration post-
1990; on it, the relations between the country and others suffered greatly but, and more 
importantly the society was completely overhauled by changes. With new ideas arriving 
from the west, Poland managed to regenerate it and for those that followed this process 
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closely there’s a role of investigative opportunities that can be seized and transported to 
other countries as a manual of good practices. 
The topic of Poland’s energy has always been intriguing for me; the fact that is thematic 
that can be extremely diverse and approached from multiple angles makes it an even 
more interesting topic. In spite of my interest in this topic, credit is due to other authors 
that before me started investigational work on it; home authors like Radzka, B. (2006) 
investigated the process of conglomeration and market liberalization in Poland while 
“foreign” authors like McGowan et al. (2004) focused the thematic at macro level by 
investigating regional influences of decision making policies. 
To elaborate this dissertation and understand these changes, a division of work was 
needed: 
 Electricity market is the 1st to be analyzed on this research; the transformation 
that it suffered on its 3 main sectors (generation, transmission, distribution) since 
the fall of communism until nowadays will be reviewed to identify its strengths, 
weaknesses and transformations. This won’t be focusing on a typical general 
assessment since the objective will be tendentially to expose the errors and to 
give a more detailed insight on how the market works including its companies. 
 Investigating the gas market follows the same pattern as the electricity market; 
the transformation post communism and evolution after the European Union 
including the role of the sector companies in it, however this market introduce 
us the geopolitics role of gas as an energy source. The introduction of this 
trending topic allows us to expand and have a better understanding of the 
importance of gas for some countries but also the motives for Poland’s agenda 
inside the European Union. 
 It is impossible to address the energy topic of any country without relating to the 
new technologies being implemented worldwide. These new environmental 
policies are a top concern across the European Union and Poland is no exception 
from it. Following its own strategies as well European Directives, we will 
analyze the level of implementation of some of the most important alternatives 
energies for the future. 
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Overall, this research will be a review and a critical analysis of Poland’s energy 
decisions; our main final goal will be an interesting study that the readers will find 
satisfying and at the same time elucidative of the different constraints that a country and 
its energy market suffer over the years. 
According to the above, this dissertation is organized in the following way: chapter 2 
presents the methodology of this work; in chapter 3 Poland’s energy economics and 
policy is assumed as a case study and thus analyzed as such; chapter 4 treats Poland’s 
situation and policy concerning green energy technologies. Chapter 5 presents our main 
conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 – Methodology 
Basically, this dissertation follows a case study methodology. To deliver such research 
results it was necessary to investigate on secondary information databases like the 
Eurostat, World Bank amongst others. After, the recoiled information was processed 
onto Excel data and correlated with the information obtained from articles, Directives 
and company information available to obtain the final results of this research. 
Table 1: Methodological process 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Determination of the results and its respective conclusions. 
Analysis and connection between recoiled information of both 
Documental information: 
European Directives Themed related articles Companies information 
Statistical information: 
Eurostat World Bank 
Central Statistical 
Office of Poland 
OECD  
What to do? 
Planning of the project 
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As a diagram above shows, the dissertation took 5 different steps to reach its conclusion 
and the 1
st
 step of it was as the plan for the dissertation. This step consisted on choosing 
the topic, on which angle I wanted to explore it and how I pretended to do it: 
 Topic: Poland energy; 
 Angle: critical analysis of its energy policy since 1990 approaching both pre and 
pro-European Union membership; 
 How: through statistical data that can be comparable to other countries, 
documentation both from official sources (Directives, government), research 
articles and information released by the companies on the researched sector; 
After the above objectives were completed, it was imperative to obtain the statistics for 
the purposed thematic we would approach; for this, we decided to use 4 main databases: 
1. Eurostat; 
2. World Bank statistics; 
3. OECD data; 
4. Central Statistical Office of Poland; 
After this statistical information was treated and transformed into graphics or tables, the 
dissertation secured the necessary documentation to interconnect to the previous step. 
We delineated 3 main sources to obtain these information’s: 1st European directives that 
would give us a sense of the law and rules that Poland had to comply including specific 
targets; 2
nd
, the research respected and was influenced by articles related to this 
thematic from several authors; 3
rd
, this dissertation approach a more practical side of the 
investigation by analyzing the market and its structure by retrieving information from 
the companies operating in it. 
Having done what we can consider has the pre-research, this dissertation assimilated 
and compressed all the information retrieved from there into the final text. On this text 
we were able to give an analysis on both macro as well as micro level. On the macro 
level we were able to identify the progress that Poland made as whole on the energy 
sector by adopting the European common rules, the transformation of the country since 
post-communist years (1990’s); on a smaller scale (micro), we were capable of doing an 
analysis on both electricity and gas market sector that comprehended the companies 
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operating there. The RES market wasn’t forgotten and with the information retrieved we 
were capable of demonstrate Poland’s evolution on this market segment. 
This dissertation concludes with a critical analysis of Poland’s energy sector; after the 
previous chapter’s analysis, we dedicate the conclusion to understand the options that 
the country followed until now and verify if those were valid strategies. These 
conclusions show us not only the pursued policy by the country but also give us the 
information of a spill-over effect when it comes to diplomatic solutions.   
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Chapter 3 – Poland as a case study 
3.1. – Overview of the Polish economy  
After more than 40 years of planned economy, Poland changed on the end of the 
1980’s. However, and due to the deeply embedded previous system, the transition to the 
free-market economy was characterized by profound structural issues mainly because of 
the huge discrepancy between the both. Under the socialist system, the polish economy 
was (as it was normal on the eastern bloc countries) developed centered on the industry 
output; Poland however had also a large percentage of the population employed on the 
primary sector, mainly on agriculture and mining related jobs (World Bank statistics of 
2015).  
Both sectors are largely correlated with each other and Poland, having one of the largest 
deposits of coal in Europe made their industrial economy dependent on this resource. 
Despite the before presented, the tertiary sector is the one that has biggest share of 
population employed during the transition of Poland to the democratic system. The gap 
between sectors increased during the years and in 2004, date of the European Union 
membership, the tertiary sector already had more than 50% of active population 
employed, with this increase being at the expense of the other 2 sectors; this trend 
continued with the tertiary sector approaching the 60%, the secondary 30% and the 
primary diminishing to roughly 10% of the population.  
This development of the Polish economy was sustained by a new matrix of politics 
implmented by the governments. The need for reformation at the time was dire, much 
due to the poor state of the economy that was largely inneficient and uncompetitive; the 
dissolution of the eastern bloc and more importantly the COMECON
1
 putted Poland in 
a delicate position. Inflation, reached historic values during the democratic transition 
with values topping at 550% in 1990 and only passed below the 10% mark in 1999, 
however, only after 2002 this value stabilized below 5% reaching last year of 2014 as 
low as 0.1% (World Bank statistics from 2015). 
                                                          
1
 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was an organization that coordinated the development of 
economies on the Soviet sphere of influence.  
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With the progress of the reforms, unemployment rates also galloped to values never 
seen before, if we consider that in Jannuary of 1990 the % of unemployment was 0.3 of 
the active population and on the same period in 1991 it rose up to 6.6%, peaking in 
1994 at 16.7% to decrease and steeply increasing again after 2000, reaching an historic 
high of 20.6% both in 2003 and 2004. (Central Statistical Office of Poland data of 
2015). 
To understand the transition period of Poland, we need to go back in time to the 1970’s, 
where a series of measures implemented by the then leader Edward Gierek of the Polish 
People’s Republic led to a failure on the long run. In an attempt to improve the country 
living conditions, Gierek government oversaw the influx of loans from western 
countries/investors; this attempt of economic Keynesiasm economics proved to be 
fruitless as the Oil crisis of 1973-74 swept the world into global recession, leaving 
Poland that was starting to “unprotect” its economy at the mercy of the loaners but also 
to an influx of western goods that caused a trade deficit due to the massive imports, 
which ultimately led to a spiral of debt growth. (Nuti, 1982) 
This situation was key for the economic polish economic transition on the late 1980’s; 
as the economy took a hit, the country entered recession with the GDP dropping as 
much as 7% in 1991 (Figure 1); also the ratio of debt per GDP peaked in 1992 and 
1993 values around to 80% (OECD stats from 2015), which meant that major structural 
reforms were needed to appease international institutions such as the IMF. Known as 
the “Balcerowicz2 plan”, these reforms were able to bring Poland from the old 
centralized to the free-market economy but also had the power to significantly reduce 
the weight of debt on the country as Poland would end up receiving a 50% “haircut” of 
its debt
3
. 
The energy sector was also included on this plan. The then governement proposed 4 
keys measures to reform the energy sector and, although none of them were a direct 
indictment to sectorial privatizations, it was clear that the objective was to create a 
                                                          
2 Leszek Balcerowicz is a former Prime and Finance minister of Poland. Was also president of the Polish 
national bank. 
3
As reported by: http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/15/business/west-plans-50-write-off-of-polish-
debt.html last accessed on July 29, 2015 
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competitive free-market. The set of measures were an intent to liberalize the sector and 
on a letter sent to the World Bank the 4 measures were as follow: (World Bank, 1998) 
 adjust the planned controlled prices;  
 restructure the sector by unbundling the “behemoths”; 
 transformation to shareholders companies; 
 creation of regulations and a regulatory energy agency. 
Further on this dissertation, this measures will be detailed on the discussion of both 
electricity and gas sector policies.  
 
3.2. – The post EU- membership 
Always a key issue in Poland politics after the society democratization was the 
European Union membership. The increasing trade with European Union members and 
the influx of investment capitals form these (mainly from Germany) facilitated the 
process of European integration and also provided Poland a boost to a closer relation 
with other European Union members. 
This membership provided Poland with more economic stability but without neglecting 
the traditional economic sectors. As an example of this, Poland inflation stabilized on 
the year post-2002 to numbers below 5% much due requirements imposed by EU laws 
in order to achieve full membership status (World Bank stats from 2015); the GDP 
growth returned to figures above 5% after decelarating on the years pre membership 
(2001 and 2002 had the lowest figures of growth since 1992 until 2014 (Figure 1)); 
despite this externalities, the high unemployment rate remained an issue to be solved. 
After some fluctuations over the years, this rate peaked in both 2003 and 2004 (the 
exact year of Poland’s entrance) decreasing then until 2009 (the lowest % since 1991) 
which, cannot be dissociated to the large wave of emigration (in particular to the British 
isles); this rate increased again over the next years stabilizing on 13% per year on 
average. (Central Statistical Office of Poland data of 2015) 
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3.2.1. – Post-EU energy sector 
The membership effects of Poland in the European community were also felt on the 
energy sector. For starters, with the previous indicators improving (emphasis on the 
GDP growth) but also with some transformations on the type of labor (Population per 
activity sector) it soon had an effect on the country energy intensity (Figure 2). The fact 
that less people were working on the primary sector meant that less energy was 
consumed on those types of activities; as an example, the fewer people working on the 
mining sector (which is an energy-intensive industry), could have helped with this 
decay of energy intensity. 
Figure 2: Energy intensity of the economy (ratio between gross consumption and 
GDP) 
 
Source: [Eurostat, 2015] 
 
The tremendous GDP growth that Poland had from these past 20 years also helps to 
explain the decrease of energy intensity of the economy. With an economy growing at 
sometimes 7% (like in 2007), one would think that the energy consumption would go 
up, however there are certain considerations we have to take before. The first 
consideration is an economic structural change that was already highlighted on the 
paragraph before; the second consideration is the adoption of energy efficiency 
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measures promoted by the government and with EU approval (this factor we will aboard 
it further on this dissertation); thirdly, we can argue about new habits of consumption 
from the general population such as replacing old electronics for new and more energy 
efficient ones. 
Despite the reduction of roughly 24% of energy intensity in the economy from 2004 to 
2013, Poland is still far from countries like Germany or the United Kingdom as both 
already boast low energy consumptions. However, Poland can be compared and be 
presented as a better example than the Czech Republic. Both countries gained 
membership to the European Union at the same time (2004) and both belonged to the 
former Eastern bloc but, the Baltic country presents a consumption of energy 20% 
smaller in 2013 than its peer from the south. In general, both countries perform poorly 
even if we compare with the data of the European Union of 28 countries. 
Poland energy dependence began to set a trend on the years after the democratic 
transition, but it was only after 2004 that this tendency started to be dictated more 
intensively. In 2004 Poland dependence on energetic resources from abroad was 14.5%, 
in 2008 this value had doubled to 30.3% (Figure 3). Objectively and when compared to 
the rest of the analyzed group, Poland has the best results in terms of auto-sufficiency; 
starting in 2005, the country managed to get the lowest value on energy dependence of 
the group, surpassing the United Kingdom despite doubling the value during the 
identified date, as we have saw before. Several explanations can be pursuit to explain 
this evolution and, amongst them the most important we can argue about are the fossil 
fuels influence on a country economics and the development of new energy sources like 
the RES
4
. 
The first explanation can and should be divided into three parts with each one 
representing the three types of fossil fuels that are mainly used in a country: coal, oil 
and gas. 
The dependency of gas was kept stable at around 70% despite some peaks and lows 
during that period; Poland is above average if we consider the numbers on EU – 28 and 
can’t be compared to the United Kingdom in 2004 due to the advantageous 
                                                          
4
 Renewable Energy Sources 
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circumstances that the British Isles have with the North Sea platforms providing both oil 
and gas, however the gap diminished significantly over the years (according to Eurostat 
estimative). The gas market will be explored in more detail further on this dissertation. 
Oil dependency in Poland has been steady over the years; ever since the communist 
regime, Poland has been dependent on this energetic resource, with some years the 
percentage of imports being calculated as more than 100%. Post-2004, the country kept 
its values within the EU-28 average and the only analyze due to note is the value of 
United Kingdom that as we have seen on the gas issue before it can also be applied to 
the oil (Eurostat estimative). 
The coal sector is perhaps the key sector of Poland energy and where the biggest share 
of questions should arise. 
As European’s Union biggest coal producer, according to the Eurostat with around 1/3 
of the total input, Poland takes a massive advantage of this resource and that is reflected 
later on the energy dependence of it. Unlike the others resources (gas and oil), coal 
always had an excess of production in comparison to the domestic consume; this is 
reflected by the negative values on the dependence of it. Poland on this topic is only 
comparable with the Czech Republic, as they both have the same level of independency 
from abroad when it comes to coal; it is undeniable that geography is their “best friend”, 
as the both countries share a border and that border is located on the Silesia
5
 region, 
which means that the European Union largest coal basin is shared by both countries. 
Despite this geographically similarity, both countries behave differently on post-2004 
membership; while the Czech Republic manages to keep its independency values above 
the 10% mark, Poland dwindles between the 10% and virtually no independency at all 
(example of 2011 with just 1.1% of excess). Despite this abnormality, the explanations 
for this situation are standard when we look at a European level. 
To start with, Poland had to make significant structural changes on its economy to gain 
the right for the European Union membership. Of these structural changes, the energy 
sector was one of the most affected, as the country saw new legislations being passed at 
                                                          
5
 Region that comprehends Poland, Czech Republic and Germany and home to several main cities like 
Ostrava (CZ), Wroclaw and Katowice (POL). Industrial heart of Poland and the most densely populated 
area of the country. 
13 
 
a transcontinental level that would link up with the domestic already in use. An example 
of this is the Directive 2002/358/EC that obliges all the countries inside the European 
Union to comply with the measure of the Kyoto Protocol as described:  
“The European Community and its Member States shall take the necessary measures to 
comply with the emissions levels set out in Annex II, as determined in accordance with 
Article 3 of this Decision.” (Council Decision 2002/358)  
The decision on this directive would eventually mean a cut on GHG
6
 which 
subsequently lead to a slower pace on the production of coal units to decrease pollutions 
rates. 
As a direct consequence of this act, the consumption of RES nearly doubled in % from 
2004 to 2013 (Figure 4) making Poland a 2 digit country when it comes to this. Being 
far from the EU-28 average, Poland can be comparable to Germany, having both 
virtually the same % of RES consumptions. 
Other external factor that contributes to the decline of coal consumption are its prices; 
according to data from BP
7
, coal prices reached historical peaks since 2004 even 
reaching above 100 $US per tonne on the European market in 2008 and 2011. This 
situation can have influenced the demand for coal as higher prices would provide a 
cause for the decrease of it. 
Alternatives to coal were found not only on RES (as we saw before) but also on other 
fossil fuels resources. Gas and oil consumption increased over the years with only a 
small exception being made to oil that had been in decline since 2012; gas on other 
hand, has been on a steady yet slow pace of increasing which validates its position as a 
future alternative to coal (Eurostat statistics).  
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 GHG: Greenhouse Gas 
7
 British Petroleum 
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3.2.2. – European regulations on the energy sector 
Convergence of the energy sector and environmental sustainability was always a key 
problematic between Poland and the European Union, therefore in 1997 the Polish 
government approved the Energy Law that would build bridges between both and allow 
a greater similarity between systems. 
As a direct influence of this act, 5 European directives were enforced in as a base 
scenario for the countries new energy strategy; these were related to the transmission 
grids on both the electricity (90/547/EEC) and gas market (91/296/EEC), the 
functioning of the markets (96/92/EC
8
, 98/30/EC
9
) and the last was concerning the 
incorporation of the production of RES on the market (2001/77/EC
10
). 
The evolution of economic, social and technological paradigms across Europe allowed 
not only the update of European rules but also the chance to implement others. Amongst 
these, the main focus was directed towards enforcing the Kyoto protocol in all European 
members (as we have seen on chapter before) with the Directive 2002/358/EC and the 
directive promoting a strategy on energy efficiency (2012/27/EU). 
This measures, implemented through the years were/are part of broader European 
program; perhaps the most famous of all is the 2020 Energy Strategy, that aims for a 
reduction at an European level as a whole of 20% of GHG, 20% increase of RES 
consumed and a 20% increase in energy efficiency and Poland, like the rest of the 
European members is obliged to make a contributive effort to achieve the proposed 
targets. 
 
3.2.3. – Energy efficiency modifications in Poland 
It is imperative to have a more detailed approach to the energy efficiency plan for 
Poland as this is a key topic for the country’s future and also a priority to the rest of the 
European member states. 
                                                          
8
 The directive has been updated since its first release; the first update was the 2003/54/EC and the latest 
updated was verified in 2009 with the 2009/72/EC directive. 
9
 Also updated firstly to the 2003/55/EC and recently to the 2009/73/EC. 
10
 Last updated on the 2009/28/EC directive. 
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As we saw on the last subchapter, the European Union promoted a Directive to deal 
with this topic. The Directive 2012/27/EU gives the basis scenario in which all member-
states have to find common ground as noted on the 1
st
 article of this act: 
“This Directive establishes a common framework of measures for the promotion of 
energy efficiency (…) to ensure the achievement of the Union’s 2020 20% headline 
target…” (European Parliament & Council Directive 2012/27) 
In this common ground, each Member State is allowed to take one of two roads; the 1
st
 
choice implicates a scheme of obligations in which the companies under the 
country/European laws are obligated to implement a series of measures (freely) that 
reduces the energy consumption to the agreed levels
11
. The 2
nd
 choice is in case of 
companies covered by the later that reject the measure can replace it by contributing in 
form of taxation, bilateral agreements with the government for a new set of regulations 
or implementing cutting edge technology to reduce the amount of wasted energy
12
. 
Despite these 2 roads that each Member State has to adopt, there was/is still space for 
traditional measures. As depict on the directive, the introduction or increase the energy 
audits (article 8) will address concerns for possible forgeries; Article 10 on the other 
hand represents the bond between final consumers and the suppliers as a “billing 
information” is adopted on it which allows consumers to have their historical data and 
help them to make the best choice in their favor. 
To evaluate the energetic efficiency, we have put a spin-off table of Table 2 (Electricity 
availability) which shows the electricity lost between production and the available in the 
end for consumption (Table 3). The results of these calculations are expectable if we 
consider that both Poland and the Czech Republic are still experiencing a transition of 
their energetic model; while the Baltic country as greatly improved (32.1% of loss in 
2004 to 24.6% in 2013) the Czechs had a much less pronounced improvement (36% to 
34%). The surprise of this table is Germany that has worsened its result, passing from a 
loss of 15.5% in 2004 to 18% in 2013; this can be explained with the aging 
infrastructures and the lack of renovation, unlike in Poland where the great influx of 
structural EU funds allowed improving facilities. 
                                                          
11
 Directive 2012/27/EU, Article 7, Paragraph 1. 
12
 Directive 2012/27/EU, Article 7, Paragraph 9. 
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3.3. – Electricity market 
Polish electricity market can be divided into two parts; the 1
st
 part related to the 
afterwards of the transition period and the 2
nd
 to the most recent European Union 
integration (which we will approach with more detail further). 
Due to Poland’s type of government and the fact that the energy sector was considered a 
key asset of the country future, it only received a minor restructure while the vertically 
integrated type of market remained, albeit with some changes on its composition (as 
previously explained). 
In 1990 and after the separation of the mining sector with the electricity sector, P.S.E.
13
 
was founded. The ongoing market restructure allowed a certain degree of independence 
to the companies in it; the vertical unbundling of this sector allowed for the energy 
sector to have a certain degree of independence, although the companies that resulted 
from that market change were still SOE
14
. Despite the lack of privatization the idea to 
promote efficiency and encourage market competition was still present. 
“…33 national distribution companies, 32 power stations and a heat-and-power plant 
and several dozen local heat-and-power plants were established (…) PSE S.A.’s 
emergence from the structure of five vertically integrated enterprises was positive. But 
on the other hand it enabled PSE S.A. to obtain a monopolistic position.” (Radzka, B., 
2006) 
With the progress towards a broader European integration, it is important to address 
once more the 1997 Energy Law and the Directive 96/92/EC as they both represented 
the 1
st
 step towards a process of market liberalization. 
As noted before, the directive was the biggest influence to this draft because it allowed 
Poland to implement key decisions ahead of the European Union membership. Amongst 
these decisions, we can highlight some articles that we do believe are essential 
(European Parliament & Council Directive 96/92): 
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17 
 
 Article 7 & 8: the transmission sector is essential to the energy supply security 
and, as such shall be maintained with a very good maintenance even if its users 
aren’t connect to the company who owns it (no discrimination); 
 Article 14 & 15: vertically integrated companies must be independent from each 
branch by ensuring a accountability separation between them and keeping the 
influx of information between them as less as possible (only important 
information shall be transmitted) thus promoting a level playing field; 
 Article 16 to 20: each EU member shall promote a free-market within the 
parameters established. 
These markets regulations are essential to promote what Poland believes that is the one 
of the foundations of the European project, the unique and integrated energy market that 
can both secure the wellbeing of the Europeans and the energy security across Europe. 
 
3.3.1. – Electricity market post – EU 
Statistically, since 2004 the electricity sector has suffered some changes; the electricity 
produced increased nearly 7% (6.7%), from 154 GWh to 164 in 2013 (Table 2), 
however it is due to notice that the biggest improvement in this sector is the efficiency 
which, brings more available electricity to consumption (Table 3). Despite this 
improvement Poland isn’t auto-sufficient on the electricity production and imports 
energy mainly from the Czech Republic (Figure 5). These electricity imports were in 
total 14 521 GWh in 2004 and decreased to 12 124 in 2013, always originated from the 
same 4 countries: the already mentioned Czech Republic, Germany (lowest value), 
Sweden and Slovakia; the geographically localization of the exporters to Poland is 
worth to explain, both Czech Republic and Slovakia border the Silesia region (the most 
industrialized and in need of energy) which can explain the reason for this high level of 
import from these 2 countries.  
Renewable energy had a stimulus during this decade of Poland on the EU as this source 
of energy passed from a residual value of 2.1% in electricity consumption to nearly 11% 
in 2013 (Table 2). Although in % Poland is still very far from what the EU – 28 
averages (25%), this is a clear improvement and step forward in Poland’s energy policy. 
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Related to all of these changes are the electricity prices for both household consumers 
and industrial (Figure 6). In 2004, the bill for domestic users was on the 10 cent of € 
per KWh and peaked in 2011 and 2013 to 15 cents; this tariff increase is not random 
and much like with the rest of Europe can be attributed to development of the RES that 
need subsidization to be competitive (especially in Poland were coal is an abundant and 
cheap resource) and, to new energetic efficiency practices that incentives a lower use of 
energy at the expense of rising tariffs. Industrial tariffs also rose during this period, 
however and due to the type of agreements that companies are capable to make with 
energy providers, the tariffs between 2003 and 2014 are on average 7 cents of € per 
KWh, having its peak in 2010 with 10 cents and the lowest value in 2004 with 4 cents. 
The European membership in 2004 brought new challenges to the sector; the pursuit of 
a more integrated market and a new series of measures, pushed Poland to a new sector 
restructure. For a better understanding of this restructure, we will separate the electricity 
market in 3 sectors: generation, transmission and distribution. 
Once more, European directives played a big part on Poland’s restructure; the directive 
2003/54/EC takes even further steps towards an energy integrated and competitive 
market as it goes further on the unbundling issue (article 10 & 15). This new regulation 
also goes further than its predecessor (Directive 96/92/EC) when it comes to separate 
accounts from each branch (article 19) and obligates each member state to implement a 
TPA system
15
 (article 20) where no discrimination is accepted between users; new 
regulatory bodies are also an obligation and should not have ties to the industry (article 
23). 
Considering these regulatory changes, the polish government took action and decided to 
implement transformations on the electricity sector. As we saw before, during the 
transition the system received a revamp to allow a competitive market on the generation 
and distribution sectors leaving the total bulk of the transmission sector to PSE. 
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3.3.1.1. – Generation 
After the 1
st
 restructuration of the energy sector (in the early 90’s), the generation 
market became fragmented in more than 30 companies where, the biggest part were 
under state supervision that at the time created a certain artificial competition to bring 
capital and promote more efficiency. It was only after the 1997 Energy Law and the 
European directives that a more serious push towards a more privatized and open to 
competition happened. 
Despite some degree of privatization on the production sector with EDF
16
 buying a 
major CHP
17
 plant in Krakow and several minors across the country (McGowan, 
Radosevic & Von Tunzelmann, 2004), the major plan for this branch were dependent on 
the documents legitimized by the government, where is stated that once the 
restructuration is done, mergers would be put into place between generation and 
distribution enterprises (World Bank, 1998). From this major organization, 5 major 
public generation companies were formed: PGE SA
18
, Tauron SA
19
, Energa SA, Enea 
SA and ZE PAK SA
20
. 
According to the ERO
21
 National Report (2014), PGE was the largest feeder of 
electricity onto to grid with a share of 39.3% in 2013 (decreased from 40.5% in 2012); 
being a company vertically integrated with the exception to the transmission system, 
PGE takes a big advantage of this factor as they possess 2 of the biggest power plants in 
Poland (Belchatów and Turów) with relative ease access to the also controlled mines of 
coal/lignite, necessary to power these 2 stations. Being a society constituted by majority 
of roughly 58% by the State Treasury, it is clear that it was intentional by the polish 
state to sell % of shares in order to attract capital to invest modernizing the equipment’s. 
(GKPGE.pl, 2015) 
Tauron, unlike PGE has a very different shareholder constituency, with the State 
Treasury being only entitled to 30.06% of the shares; however it is due to notice that 
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one of the largest partners is also a State controlled company (KGHM Polska Miedz 
S.A.) that technically upgrades the public sphere of the company to roughly 40%. Also 
a vertically integrated company, Tauron has on hard coal and lignite the main sources of 
material to generate power (87% of it) and it is also the 2
nd
 biggest feeder of electricity 
to the grid according to the ERO National Report (2014) with 13.6% of the total 
electrical power in Poland in 2013.(Tauron.pl, 2015) 
Enea is the 3
rd
 company with public status on our list; according to the data recoil, the 
State Treasury has in its possession 51.5% of the company. Although not possessing 
mineral resources like PGE and Tauron, Enea can still be considered a vertical 
integrated company due to its generation and upwards market activity (distribution and 
retail). Having the largest plant on the outskirts of Warsaw, Enea relies on fossil fuels 
for roughly 92% of its electricity production despite possessing several RES (Wind and 
Hydro) plants (Enea.pl, 2015). It is according to the ERO National Report (2014) the 4
th
 
largest producer of electricity power in Poland (8.1%).  
Energa is the last of the “big 4”22 to be analyzed. This company, as opposite to the other 
3 has a better approach on the sustainability front since 41% of their installed capacity is 
from RES; however it is the smallest of the 4 in electricity to generated to the grid with 
3.2% in 2013 (ERO National Report, 2014). Maintaining the tradition of energy 
companies in Poland, Energa has the State Treasury as its biggest shareholder with a 
majority of 51.52%. (Energa.pl, 2015) 
Having been recently privatized at 100% (in 2012), ZE PAK S.A. (Zespol Elektrowni 
Patnow-Adamow-Konin) is the only polish company that is able to be on the top of the 
electrical producers with a 7.3% share in 2013 (ERO National Report 2014). This 
enterprise is composed by 4 large power plants (as the company names itself names it 
and Patnow has 2 located there), with a total capacity of 1 200MW and completely 
                                                          
22
 Big 4: Name attributed to PGE, Tauron, Enea and Energa; as the symbol of the consolidation process, 
mergers these 4 companies have activity in all energy sectors with the backing of the State therefore the 
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powered by lignite
23
, which makes them an ecological concern despite best attempts to 
reduce pollution. 
The last generator to be analyzed is EDF. Having 9.7% of market share EDF is the 
biggest foreign company to operate on the production of electricity in Poland (ERO 
National Report, 2014); much of this operation is contributed by the power plant located 
in Rybnik that alone is able to output 1 775 MW of electricity. After being privatized 
successfully in 2001
24
, this coal based power plant has been on the center of the EDF 
Polska strategy. 
 
Table 4: Market power (proxy) and corporate structure. 
Name Market share State % shareholder 
PGE SA 39.3% 58.39% 
Tauron SA 13.6% 30.06% 
Enea SA 8.1% 51.5% 
Energa 3.2% 51.52% 
ZE PAK SA 7.3% 0 
EDF Polska 9.7% 0 
Source(s): [ERO National Report 2014; GKPGE.pl; Tauron.pl; Enea.pl; Energa.pl]  
 
3.3.1.2 - Transmission 
The electricity transmission sector is the opposite of both the generator and distribution 
solely because there is only one player in it, PSE. Being separated from its origin 
company PGE-PSE in 2007 in direct consequence of the Directive 2003/54/EC that 
obliged the unbundling of the energy market (transmission and distribution), PSE was 
named as a vital component of the polish energy security by the State Treasury: 
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“In line with the regulations under the Energy Law Act, the State Treasury shall hold 
the entire package of shares. Pursuant to the regulation of the Council of Ministers, the 
company was included on the list of companies of key importance to public order or 
public security, and to the economic well-being of the State.” (State Treasury, 2008) 
As so, PSE remains fully under State control, more objectively under the Treasury 
administration control with the strategic goal of expanding the network, increase the 
safety and reliability of it and implementing the single buyer model (World Bank, 
1998); if the objective was to bring competition (as legitimized by the directive) into the 
market, this single buyer model created an impediment to it that even the European 
Commission started to investigate. 
In 2005, the Commission launched an investigation to these PPA’s25 arguing that the 
lack of competition was distorting the market and as such, cancelation of these 
agreements would be required. The Commission noted that during the transition period 
of the 90’s, Poland enforced this type of program to encourage innovation and protect 
the investments made, however and according to European rules, the liberalization of 
the market is a must and shall have to be enforced. The problem with enforcing this are 
the duration of these contracts, which range from 2005 to 2027 making it necessary to 
compensate those prejudiced by it. The compensation to end these contracts follows the 
basis of the date of when Poland entered the European Union (2004) which means that 
all aid is deductible on the compensation package of the generators that benefited from 
it
26
. In spite of these attempts, the level of contract cancelations wasn’t the expected and 
in 2007 only 1.5% of electricity was bought on the liberalized market (Nowak, B., 
2009). 
Currently, the statute of PSE has been discussed at a European level; recently, in 2014 
the Commission published an opinion required by ERO21 where it was asked to verify if 
PSE was complying with the European unbundling rules. This verification process had 
2 significant analyses; the 1
st
 was concerning the ownership of the transmission system 
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 The European Commission started to evaluate this situation 1
st
 in 2001: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-01-1077_en.htm?locale=en, 2
nd
 in 2005: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-
1455_en.htm?locale=en, until the decision was made in 2007: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
07-1408_en.htm; all data was last visited on September 12, 2015; 
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and the 2
nd
 was concerning the State/political influence on the company. On the 1
st
 
analysis, the Commission puts certain doubts on ownership of some equipment’s, 
mainly on the low-voltage lines (220Kv) that aren’t owned by PSE but are 
administrated by it and on the independency of the operator towards the electricity 
producers (if all are entitled to the same conditions on the access to the market). The 2
nd
 
analysis by the commission is concerning the independency of PSE relative to the State, 
namely to the other energy SOE’s14 (PGE, Tauron, Enea and Energa); according to ERO 
there’s enough separation between both cause, while PSE is indeed part of the State 
Treasury it’s the Economy Ministry that de facto runs and dictates the company policy 
therefore creating the needed independency between sectors. As a conclusion to this 
process, the Commission upholds any further detailing of these highlighted cases 
arguing that it’s up to the ERO to enforce European laws on the national sector by it 
represented. (European Commission, 2014)  
 
3.3.1.3 - Distribution 
Like the generation sector, the electricity distribution sector is a consequence of the 
restructure followed by the polish State that eventually led to the consolidation 
processes; PGE, Tauron, Enea and Energa are the main players involved into this sector 
and despite the fact that there aren’t any geographic/entry barriers, this sector is run in a 
relative false competition market. The system is divided in 4 regions where each 
company has the upper hand (Figure 7): the north is operated by Energa, the north-west 
by Enea, the east by PGE and the south by Tauron; the only exception to this rule is 
RWE that has the distribution of the city of Warsaw and until 2011 Vattenfall had a 
distribution center on the Silesia region (Tauron region). 
“The agreement with Tauron includes the distribution, network services and sales 
operations of GZE (…) GZE is a Polish Distribution System Operator providing 
approximately 10 per cent of the electricity consumed in Poland (…) serving 1.1 million 
customers…” (Vattenfall, 2011). 
The control of the distribution channels by producers raises concerns to how truly 
independent is this sector from the rest; if we take a look back we know that these 4 
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represented distributers have State treasury stakes and that the transmission company 
belongs also to the State treasury (although its being controlled by the Economy 
ministry). This conflict of interests arises to such an extent that even national law 
(article 9d of the Energy Act) is broken by this and consequently Europeans laws as 
well (Nowak, B., 2007).  
Another issue on this market segment is the existence of regulated prices that “kills” 
possible competition; this regulatory implemented measure to protect the poor users is 
in fact harming them for the simple that with regulated prices the distribution companies 
fail to provide the innovation to the networks that may come from possible increase in 
income. Another reason for this harm is the highly concentrated market that fails to 
bring competition and therefore is not providing the best possible service to the 
consumer (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2011). 
 
3.4. – Gas 
Poland’s gas market is characterized by the high levels of dependency from abroad; 
nearly 75% of its needs are imported and the tendency is for this dependency to 
continue its growth. This tendency is explained not by a decrease in production (which 
in fact increased although by a residual value) but by increases on the consumption. As 
written previously, gas could be a natural replacement to coal as the primary energy 
provider to the economy, however if we take a look at the Eurostat stats we will note 
that the coal consumption remained solid at around 50 thousand tones and gas only 
increased roughly 3 thousand tones since 2002 to 2013. Being a dependent country on 
gas, Poland is on average with the rest of the EU and below Germany on the %; the only 
country analyzed that wasn’t dependent on imports was the UK during a short that now 
seems very unlikely to return considering the shortage on the North Sea explorations 
(data according to Eurostat). 
Having only sole actor on the gas market, Poland committed to make reforms on it 
during the transition period, much like it did for the electricity sector. The planned 
reforms committed to the World Bank involved transforming PGNIG into a stock 
company and to separate the diverse branches of it creating more independency between 
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companies and, to prepare for the future of market liberalization (World Bank, 1998). 
Following this, Poland adopted the European common rules, the Directives that 
promoted a more profound restructure on gas market and in PGNIG. 
Having energy security as the key point on gas energy policy, the polish State started to 
implement the directives needed to comply with the European common rules; at that 
time, PGNIG had the total vertical control of the market which included the imports of 
this resource mostly from Russia. Being a strategic company to the country due to its 
multiple influences on the gas market, the polish State Treasury holds roughly 72% of 
its shares (PGNiG.pl, 2015) with the rest being disperse amongst several members of 
the company/employers.  
The production of this fossil fuel is key part on PGNIG strategy; being the sole producer 
(directly or through subsidiaries) in Poland, PGNiG is capable of getting a sizeable 
income from this and, with proven reserves that account to more than 85B m
3
 in 2013 
this income will still be able to continue (PGNiG.pl, 2015). It comes with no surprise 
after these facts that despite the best efforts from the polish government to promote 
market liberalization, its gains are residual; according to Energy Act of 1997, the market 
should be forcibly liberalized to allow competition in every segment, however in 2007 
only 1.8% of all gas bought was from companies with no relations to PGNIG thus 
creating a severe unbalanced market (MRPA, 2009). 
Long term contracts for gas imports also hinder the development of the market not only 
because it creates a barrier upstream but also because it can be financially prejudicial. 
An example of this is the contract negotiated between the polish government (by the 
hand of PGNIG) and Qatargas in 2009. Back then, with the price of gas indexed to high 
oil prices, the government celebrated a contract between 340 and 380 US dollars per 
Mcm
27
; if we compared this value to values practiced on the import from Russian gas 
(400 to 500 US dollars) they are objectively low, however as speculated by the Polish 
press this value can rise and even surpass the values of the Russian contracts by the time 
it will finish in 2029
28
. This type of business creates therefore 2 types of problems; 1
st
, 
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we have the risk of swaps that can either go both ways and 2
nd
, we have the 
infrastructural problem of it on which PGNIG controls storage and prioritizes their 
imports/production storages. 
The 1
st
 problem is the exact same problem that the polish government/PGNIG faced; 
with the gas prices decreasing from 2009 (date of the contract) to 2012 (date of the 
renegotiation) the polish enterprise was left with a bad deal in hands. 
The 2
nd
 problem is more complex, since European market rules are not technically 
being broken but the conflict of interests exists; PGNIG is the owner of all the storage 
units in Poland through its subsidiary company OSM
29
 that was created to comply with 
European rules of unbundling. This however creates a conflict of interests since OSM 
may prioritize the storage of PGNIG gas imports/production over other gas companies. 
This issue has been emphasized by the European Commission that warned Poland in 
2010 through a press release:  
“The obligation to store gas on the Polish territory discriminates EU companies 
importing gas to Poland and forces them to seek for ways to transport gas to these 
storage facilities. Since transmission capacities to and in Poland are not available and 
since the Yamal pipeline is not accessible for importers, the so called "territoriality 
clause" forecloses the market for EU gas suppliers endangering in turn security of 
supply of Poland.” (European Commission, 2010) 
Natural gas transmission is at Gaz-System SA responsibility which is a subsidiary of 
PGNIG created from the obligation of unbundling the market; like on other branches of 
the market, this independency between companies is only on paper because the conflict 
of interests still exists. The best example of this happened in 2006 when Gaz-System 
SA demanded from Emfesz
30
 a deposit of gas in gas storages in order to be able to 
provide the gas contracted by Emfesz to the final consumer (Icis.com, 2015); the fact 
that Gaz-System SA and not PGNIG, who is the de facto owner of the reserves created 
obstacles to the realization of this deal shows, or at least raises suspicion of the true 
independency between them. 
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Being the transmission operator, Gaz-System SA is at the helm of the polish section of 
the Yamal pipeline in spite it being a joint project from PGNIG and Gazprom named as 
EuRoPol Gaz
31
. This operation as seen earlier on the European Commission press 
release is violating internal market rules by not allowing a correct and loyal competition 
between market actors. The “territoriality clauses” as they are called, are an impediment 
of foreign companies to have access to the market as they prevent them from using 
facilities without certain compensations (in this case a % of storage); this creates the 
market discrimination that lead to the already before studied case between PGNIG/Gaz-
System SA vs. Emfesz. 
Like on the rest of the gas sector, the distribution market still has its share of problems 
when facing competition. According to the polish regulator ERO, in 2014 the share of 
sales of PSG Sp. z o.o.
32
 was 89.24% and despite a decrease from 94.42% from the 
previous year it is still an extremely high percentage
33
. Once more, PGNIG controls this 
branch of the market through the previous mentioned company as it is its only 
shareholder, using the same kind of influence as previously.  
Changes of this market are taken care with severe caution; this “tweezers” policy is 
ambiguous at times since it implies Poland to play a nearly double game, 1
st
 with Russia 
and 2
nd
 with the European Union. 
Table 5: Gas sector structure. 
Name Branch PGNIG subsidiary 
PGNIG GK Exploration/Production ------- 
Gaz-System SA Transmission Yes 
OSM Sp. z. o.o. Storage Yes 
PSG Sp. z. o.o. Distribution Yes 
Source: [PGNiG.pl] 
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3.4.1. - Poland and the geopolitics of gas: final considerations 
There is no more ambiguous economic relation for Poland than its relation with Russia. 
Due to the historical common history, both countries always had a troubled relation and, 
if during the Middle Ages or after the relation was decided by military means, 
nowadays the economy is the new “battlefield” with its focus mainly on the gas market 
and economics. This “front” can be one of the reasons to why Poland is advancing 
slowly on the reformation of the gas market; the need for a strong company in it that can 
and is able to compete with the Russia giant gas company Gazprom. 
As we saw before, Poland embarked on a wave of diversification of the gas suppliers 
and, the deal with the Qatari gas company was one of the examples of it. In fact, if we 
take a look into Gazprom exports to Poland we can see a decline of gas transitioned 
(Table 6); in 2012 the imports from Gazprom peaked at 13.1 Bcm
34
 while in 2014 the 
imports were already at 9.1 Bcm. This tendency is not only felt in Poland but also 
across Europe; perhaps, on this, the Czech Republic holds the best example since it 
managed to pass from importing 9 Bcm in 2010 to 0.8 Bcm in 2014, almost stopping 
importing Russian gas. 
Gas pricing has also been an issue for Poland; this makes even more case to have a 
strong national company on the gas sector like PGNIG; as it is shown, Poland pays a 
price of over 475 $US per thousand of cubic meter it imports (in 2013); alongside it are 
other countries like the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Lithuania and, while the other 2 
Baltic countries (Estonia and Latvia) pay a smaller fee it isn’t much different from the 
latters (Figure 8). The curious fact jumping right to everyone conclusions is that all of 
these countries were part or belonged to the sphere of influence of the late Soviet 
Union; this can be seen as an attempt of blackmailing by Russia to these countries if, we 
consider that most them have no other means to import gas but from Russia and 
therefore are total or highly dependent on Russian gas. 
Poland sees gas and energy security as a matter of national identity; PGNIG therefore is 
key for this strategy since it is (with the support of the State and the European Union) 
the only polish company of this sector that can make a stand against these types of 
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intromissions. This was proven in 2012 when PGNIG successfully negotiated with 
Gazprom a reduction of between 10 to 15% from the 550 $US paid in 2011
35
; more 
recently, PGNIG and Gazprom embarked once again on conversations to further reduce 
the price of imported gas with no visible results up to this date
36
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 Has confirmed by: http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/russia-and-poland-agrees-on-gas-price-
reduction, last accessed on September 11, 2015; 
36
 Based on reports from: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-05/poland-starts-talks-
with-russian-gazprom-to-cut-gas-price and last visited on September 10, 2015; 
30 
 
Chapter 4 - Towards a greener energy policy 
Given Poland late European Union entry (2004), but still in line with countries from the 
former Eastern bloc (Czech Republic, Slovakia etc.), renewable energies sources were 
vastly underused as Poland never felt the necessity to adapt, invest and adopt these kind 
of alternatives due to the cheap access to coal. The first attempt to improve this situation 
was presented by the Energy Act of 1997; on it, the definition of RES in Poland would 
appear: 
“renewable energy source – a source which uses wind power, solar power, geothermal 
energy, sea wave, sea current and tidal energy, or energy obtained from the fall of 
rivers and biomass energy, energy from landfill biogas as well as biogas produced in 
the process of sewage disposal and treatment or decomposition of plant and animal 
remains;” (The Office of Sejm, 1997) 
This comprehensive definition is important to understand what is possible to consider or 
not RES; the best example of this is if nuclear energy should or not be considered as a 
RES source, since a small amount of uranium can produce a tremendous energetic 
power. 
To put into practice this plan of a more sustainable energy policy, it was essential for 
the Energy Act to provide certain type of terms that could help a quicker 
implementation of green energies. Reviewing the Act, we found some measures that are 
indeed helpful for a more competent implementation; on these measures we found 1 that 
we can considered as informative and other 3 that are exclusive to improve competitive 
chances. 
The informative measure refers to the implementation of a certificate of origin; this 
measure, allows people and the State to be informed of the amount produced and, can 
have various uses like for example on taxation issues. This measure is present on the 1
st
 
paragraph of the 9e article. 
More important for the daily issues of the company are perhaps the competitive 
measures proposed by this Act that we will present. 
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The 1
st
 set of measures obliges companies that are connected to this sector to give full 
priority on the purchase of electricity from RES (article 9a.1) and provide full priority 
plus acceptance on the grid to all electricity from these sources (article 9a.4). 
Secondly, it is provided to all RES producers’ tax exemptions if their producing 
capacity is below 5 MW by sparing them of paying for license fees (on article 34(4)); 
“The energy enterprises which generate electricity using renewable energy sources of 
capacity not higher than 5 MW shall be exempt from the fees referred to in (1) in the 
scope of the energy generated by them in those sources.” (The office of Sejm, 1997) 
Thirdly, it is worth noticing a possible ambiguous measure for this program; the 
subsidization of RES through taxation of other energy sources (oil etc.) that may (or 
not) reflect on the final consumer price to pay (article 45(3)); 
“The tariffs for gaseous fuels, electricity and heat may reflect the costs of co-funding of 
the development of renewable energy sources by the energy enterprises.” (The Office of 
Sejm, 1997) 
Despite Poland being on the vanguard at the time on RES with the 1997 Energy Act, it 
was only in 2001 that the European Union promoted a more serious approach to this 
issue with the 2001/77/EC Directive; this Directive (which was later updated with the 
2009/28/EC Directive) can be consider as the 1
st
 European response to the previous 
signed Kyoto Protocol. The implementation of support schemes to the 
producers/investors on RES (article 4) or the purchase prioritization of RES powered 
electricity by transmission/distribution companies (article 7) are just some of the 
obligatory points that the EU inscribes on this Directive in order to promote and 
facilitate the expansion of RES.  
To facilitate the implementation of the previous policies and its updates on the 
2009/28/EC Directive, Poland adopted the National Renewable Energy Action Plan 
(NREAP) for a better strategy and policies integration. Targets and measures are both 
established considering the specific features of Poland, as we will discuss further. 
This plan is incorporated on a broader strategy; the Energy Policy of Poland until 2030 
allows people to have a more in depth strategy of Poland energy policy for the next 
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decade(s); energy security, energy efficiency, environmental issues and the energy mix 
(where RES are included) are some of the topics that this wide reform program will 
study the implementation of.  
 
4.1. – RES current development 
Renewable energy in Poland has been in constant rise since 2004; having agreed to a 
target of 15% in gross energy consumption from renewable energy sources by 2020, 
Poland (if we look at the recent numbers) seems capable of achieving it. As seen on 
Figure 4, since 2004 the percentage of energy originated from renewable sources 
almost doubled, increasing from 6.9% in 2004 to 11% in 2013; it is expected that this 
number have rose since we are already in 2015. 
A consequence of this rise in renewable solutions can be found on the other type of 
energies specially the coal sector. Numbers show a steady decline of production which 
is accompanied by a not very pronounced decline in consumption; if we compare it to 
pre-EU years this is quite meaningful given the fact that Poland is one of world’s 
biggest coal producers. 
From 2006 to 2010, Poland experienced a decrease (according to Eurostat data) on the 
production of coal from 67 105.9 TOE to 55 076.9 TOE; this, comprises a break in 
production around 17.9% in 4 years which nearly turned the country from exporter to 
importer; consumption also decreased around 5 000 TOE from 2006 to 2009, rising in 
2010 by 3 000 TOE. Comparing this data to the ones on Figure 4 it is clear to access 
that renewable energies benefited from this fall, experiencing a rise in demand of 3% 
after a slow start. 
As seen on previously, for this increase on RES, investments had to be made in 
infrastructures; according to the polish government stats (Figure 9), the installed 
capacity of RES increased nearly 6 times on the period from 2005 to 2014. This period, 
after the European Union membership saw changes on the type of energy with more 
usage. In 2005, which can be consider as the baseline year, Hydro type of energy was 
prominent and had the biggest share amongst RES; this situation where Hydro 
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“dominated” continued until the year 2010, when Wind energy “overthrown” Hydro as 
the type of energy with more installed capacity. Until the year 2014, this increment in 
Wind energy continued, being this by a long difference the type of energy with more 
installed capacity. 
Figure 9: Poland installed capacity of RES (MW) 
 
Source: [ERO (retrieved from: http://www.ure.gov.pl/pl/rynki-energii/energia-
elektryczna/odnawialne-zrodla-ener/potencjal-krajowy-oze/5753,Moc-zainstalowana-
MW.html and last accessed on September 10, 2015)] 
 
It’s also clear that we have to highlight the growing figures from Biomass installed 
capacity; this type of energy was in 2005 the second with more capacity but, it was 
quickly surpassed by Wind on the following years. Having stabilized until 2010, it 
received a new impulse and was capable to surpass Hydro capacity in 2013 as the 
number two of RES with most installed capacity in Poland.  
 
4.2. – Wind energy 
Wind energy is, according to the polish government data, the type of energy that will 
increase more from 2006 to 2030 (Table 7). 
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Starting with a residual 22 ktoe of electricity generated in 2006, the objective will be to 
increase this production up to 1 530 ktoe in 2030; if the figures turn out correctly then 
wind energy will increase its share on the renewable energy market from approximately 
6% in 2006 to 45% in 2030. Given this vast increase it becomes imperative to 
understand the reasons to why the polish government has such high expectations. 
The polish government assumes that the installed capacity of Wind energy will continue 
to increment (Figure 9) over the years; in order for these projections to materialize, the 
government added financial aid packages to the already enlisted Energy Act measures 
that will allow Wind energy producers to reduce costs of production.  
On the measures implemented by the Energy Act is the minus 5MW producers 
exemption fee; on it, we came to the conclusion that of the total of 188 installations of 
Wind energy, 74 are below the required 5MW of production to have the tax exemption; 
this, is a relative high number of nearly 40% of exemptions that means micro/small 
generation in Poland is very popular amongst investors (Table 8). 
An interesting measure on the NREAP strategy document is the exchange of 
experience/know-how with other companies or organizations; in this particular case, the 
cooperation was between the polish State by the hand of the Environment ministry and 
the Danish Energy Agency and focused on the improvement of Wind powered energy. 
The campaign, named as Polish-Danish Energy Branding allows and facilitates Polish 
companies and individuals to learn from some of the best in the business. 
Location of Wind farms takes a comprehensive and exhaustive research, since, it is 
necessary to identify the best spots in order to maximize the investment. Due to this, 
sometimes the best spots available are placed in more sensible areas which, makes it 
necessary to obtain certain certifications and proper studies to comply with the 
territorial spatial organization: 
“The draft National Spatial Development Concept 2030 prepared by the Ministry of 
Regional Development, assumes appointing zones for the purposes of the development 
of wind energy, which are going to be determined at the level of voivodship spatial 
development plans and are to be reflected in documents drawn up on the local planning 
level.” – (Minister of Economy, 2010) 
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There’s a correspondence between the locals where Wind farms are implemented and 
the regions where the wind is stronger and more capable of having a more profitable 
production (Figure: 10). The Baltic coast has the highest value of wind per m/s (the 
darker the green is the highest is the wind speed) is the place with more potential for 
Wind energy; after it, the center of Poland (corridor between Warsaw-Poznan to the 
German border) is another “safe” place to invest. As it is clear from the huge 
concentration of Wind farms, investors followed the wind map to program their 
investments. 
Wind strategy in Poland won’t be concentrated only in land. The government prepared a 
series of measures/strategies to facilitate offshore Wind power production on the Baltic 
Sea; for it, it was published on the NREAP a 4 point program: 
1. Identification of legal barriers that are preventing investments in offshore wind 
farms; 
2. Preparation of regulations/laws that can contribute to facilitate investment; 
3. Develop and make key important decisions for the future of offshore energy 
(grid systems); 
4. Create synergies between different government bodies to find and allocate 
specific places to the development of offshore energy. 
 
4.3. – Biomass 
Biomass has an enormous potential in Poland; not only is the country one of the largest 
in Europe by area it also contains a vast % of it used by either forest or agriculture 
purposes (Table 9). 
Foreseeing this potential, the polish government is expectant and has projected that 
similarly to Wind, Biomass will be another key energy source for the future of the 
country. In 2006, Biomass was the 2
nd
 type of energy most required (amongst RES) for 
the consumption of electricity and, in 2010 Biomass topped the energy charts as the 
most demanded surpassing Hydro energy; this growing tendency is assumed by the 
Polish government and, it is simulated that in 2030 the demand of Biomass power will 
be 994.9 ktoe (an increase of roughly 100% since 2015). 
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Energy competitiveness is always a key issue surrounding RES types; for Biomass to be 
competitive, the polish government introduced a series of measures to improve this key 
aspect. 
For starters, and considering the vast rural population that it still possesses, Poland 
developed a document entitled Overall perspective on rural development
37
 that, clarifies 
strategies on Biomass development. This document provides a new strategy of new 
dynamics to rural areas by implementing new ways of subsistence and as the National 
Renewable Energy Action Plan states: 
“(…) assumes that socio-economic function of rural areas cannot be reduced only to 
production of agricultural raw materials (…) but, to a growing extent, involves supply 
of other goods and fulfillment of functions that are significant from the point of view of 
society and ensuring sustainable social and economic development (…)” (Minister of 
Economy, 2010) 
This new dynamic towards the rural development demonstrates that in the future (short-
medium term), agricultural food production will cohabit with the production of RES 
either from Wind, Solar or as in form of Biomass provided by farms indicated for 
production. 
Biomass production can be a topic very vague when we address it since, there are a lot 
of resources that can be used in it. In Poland, the government emphases 3 sectors that 
can contribute more regularly and consistently: 
 Forests: given the vast area that of forests of roughly 30% (Table 9) it is only 
normal that this would be a key sector on Biomass production; several initiatives 
concerning efficiency on the forestry sector and forest cleaning allow this type 
of energy to develop even further. The projections of 2015 and 2020 (Table 10) 
are relative identical for energy produced based on forest resources. 
 Agriculture: much like forestry, agriculture in Poland is characterized by a vast 
territory of production (Table 11); the NREAP argues that the primary objective 
for agriculture is undoubtedly to guarantee food supply but, products whose are 
not needed (therefore considered an excess) are subject to Biofuel 
transformation. In 2009, the production of Biofuels was destined to be 3.2% of 
                                                          
37 Document in Polish: Zarys kierunków rozwoju obszarów wiejskich 
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the total of agricultural land according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
development. 
 Waste: of all 3 sectors, Biomass production from Waste residues has the biggest 
diversity of sources, however not all residues are acceptable to produce energy. 
To support this claim, we can argue that in terms of energy production, Waste is 
the 3
rd
 source behind Forestry and Agriculture; despite this, Waste production 
energy is estimate to take a leap from 2015 to 2020 according to the NREAP but 
will still continue to be the 3
rd
 source of Waste energy (Table 10). Diversity of 
sources is a big advantage of this type of energetic source; in total, the NREAP 
identifies 11 types from within the Waste sector that can be used for energy 
development. Of these 11 types I would highlight municipal waste, waste related 
to the industry sector and agricultural/livestock animal waste. Each of these is a 
representation of 3 traditional sectors (the urban/city life, industries and 
agriculture) in Poland and that is the reason for this selection. 
 
4.4. – Biogas 
Energy produced from biogas is an alternative to the co-firing of residues that we have 
seen previously on the biomass subchapter; derived from the same type sources, biogas 
represents a valuable alternative not only for RES but also as a substitute or 
complementary for natural gas energy. 
This fact helps to empower biogas production since both (natural gas and biogas) can 
use transmission, storage and distribution installations, which in end is a tremendous 
boost on the competitivity of this energetic resource. The 2009/28/EC also helps 
fomenting this type of energy by leveling the gas market: 
“(…) Member States shall ensure that the charging of transmission and distribution 
tariffs does not discriminate against gas from renewable energy sources.”(European 
Parliament & Council Directive 2009/28) 
Despite this, Poland had in 2014 only 33 plants producing Biogas which is a rather 
small number of it if we consider the potential of these energetic resource (Muradin, M., 
2014). 
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4.5. – Hydro energy 
Despite being the RES with more demand in 2006, hydroelectric power in Poland has 
ever since stagnated; on Table 7 this situation is noticeable and, while hydro power 
demand stagnated, the rest of RES grew at a pace of around 100% from 2006 to 2010 
and doubled its value to 2015. Meanwhile, Hydro power only grew around 20% from 
2006 to 2010 and, approximately 14% from 2010 to 2015. Looking again for the table, 
it is clear that the polish government doesn’t perceive Hydro energy as one of the top 
priorities for its future considering the low amount of growth that it’s estimated for it 
from 2015 to 2030. 
The environment is a key element when considering Hydro power plants. The impact 
that these projects have on the surrounding habitats can be sometimes destructive and 
that’s perhaps one of the main reasons to why these types of installations in Poland are 
small sized plants; in fact, the polish government agrees that only small hydro plant will 
have an increase (which can explain the relative stagnation of these RES energetic 
sector). 
The fact that small hydro plants are on the rise unlike large ones can be explained by the 
measures promoted by the government. Much like we saw earlier in Wind farms, Hydro 
plants below 5MW have special benefits that reward them with a boost in 
competitiveness. Apart from this boost, entry barriers play a big part in this sector; on it, 
small hydro has a big advantage over larger plants by the fact that since it has a small 
construction it will cause less damage than a large construction, how Paska, J. et al. 
declares: 
“Even though the existing potential for hydropower in Poland is not yet completely 
exploited, because of political decision, further expansion is only possible to a limited 
extent. Operating a hydropower station is always associated with a serious intrusion 
into ecological systems. Energy policy indicates development of hydropower only in 
small-scale power stations.”  (Paska, J. et al., 2007) 
Not only environment impacts are an entry barrier for hydro plants in Poland, the terrain 
is also a handicap to develop these infrastructures. With the country inserted on the 
European plain (that extends from Netherlands to Russia), Poland is plan country with 
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very few elevations, valleys or other sort of terrain that hydro plants can benefit from; 
on the south of country where the Carpathian Mountains influence the terrain 
roughness, it is a prime terrain to develop this RES. As seen on Figure 11, the big 
chunk of hydro plants are indeed located on the south of country where the more rugged 
terrain is felt; there’s however some exceptions that we can locate on the map. 
Environmental risk is indeed a big factor when it comes to develop Hydro powered 
energy in Poland and this is perhaps one of the biggest challenge this sector faces that 
eventually leads to a more careful approach by investors and therefore a preference for 
small plants. 
 
4.6. – Nuclear energy 
The dilemma of Nuclear energy affects not only Poland but also the contemporary 
world in general; with the resolution 4/2009 approved by the Council of Ministers, 
Poland is undertaking efforts to retransform its energy mix in order to include nuclear 
energy. These efforts by the polish government are so intense that later that year of 
2009, on the approval of the Poland Energy Policy until 2030, an entire chapter of it is 
dedicated to this energy by promoting measures and defining a strategy since mining to 
future locations of the plant and possible radioactive waste treatment. 
Nuclear energy not only counts with the high level of approval by government but it 
also boost a tremendous popular support by its people; according to poll realized in 
2014, 64% were in favor of the nuclear option which, is an improvement from past 
years when the “Yes” scored 50% (2009). (World-nuclear-news.org, 2014) 
Despite this popular support, public consultation is still required not only at an internal 
level but also externally; on the external consultation, bordering countries were invited 
to give their opinion on the matter. Amongst them there was Germany, Slovakia and 
Austria that despite not having a physical border with Poland is still close enough for 
these types of projects to have an impact: 
“Acting under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act, the draft PNPP has 
been subjected to the Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment process” (Minister of 
Economy, 2014) 
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Internal consultations were also held mostly at an environmental level but also to 
possible investors; on it, the Voivodeship/Voivode play a key part on defining the 
specifics of the project since, they are responsible for the conduction of the 
consultations amongst their constituents and, also responsible to realize impact studies 
on the location the project is to be instituted. 
“The Voivode is competent for the following (…) requesting GDEP38 to reconcile the 
environmental conditions, together with a renewed impact report; conducting public 
consultation for renewed environmental impact assessment (…)” (Minister of 
Economy, 2014) 
Being this a massive project, PGE took control of it; however in order to reduce costs, 
an agreement was forged between other important companies of the energy sector and 
mining: 
“Partnerships may get formed (…). This enables to reduce the cost of acquisition of 
debt financing, which in the case of NPP
39
 is the key factor (…). PGE Polska Grupa 
Energetyczna S.A., the investor of the first Polish NPP, has entered into talks with 
Tauron Polska Energia S.A., Enea S.A. and KGHM Polska Miedz S.A. (…)” (Minister 
of Economy, 2014) 
The key to understand this is that all of these companies cited above are heavily linked 
to the State Treasury, on which it controls it or has a very generous shareholding 
percentage. 
There is no denying the importance that nuclear power can have in Poland; the 
document Energy Policy of Poland until 2030 puts this energy source with over 10% 
share on the final energy production by that same year; this increment will also have to 
lead to changes on the transmissions systems which means that PSE as the sole system 
provider will have to invest to comply to the new needs that nuclear powered electricity 
brings to the market. 
Nuclear energy can be a two way street; on the PNPP, the Fukushima accident of 2011 
is highlighted as serious accident but, and I quote:  
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“(…) bears no immediate or direct consequence with respect to Poland whatsoever. In 
particular, there is no need to amend or modify the strategic governmental documents.” 
(Minister of Economy, 2014) 
This self-assurance by the polish government is corroborated by its security strategy and 
also on its geological conditions, since it is very unlikely for Poland to suffer a major 
earthquake like Japan did; on the security matter, Poland follows 2 strategies: the 1
st
 
strategy encompasses the infrastructures of the plant that have to be state of the art, 
modern facilities; the 2
nd
 strategy follows safeties procedures connected mostly to the 
workers at the nuclear plant, where formations and information play a big part of it. 
The build up to gain access to this energy source represents a tremendous effort by the 
Polish authorities that can’t be dismissed. When it comes fruitful it will have the 
potential to boost immensely the energy mix of the country as well as providing an 
increase of electricity production that can eventually spill-over to a cheaper access of it. 
This project seems to be well underway to become Poland’s symbolism of the future. 
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5. - Conclusions 
Following the trend of the European Union, Poland is slowly advancing to the much 
required reforms on its key energetic sectors, both electricity and gas. On the electricity 
the reforms have been implemented according to EU parameters however, if we 
withdraw the generation branch of the equation there’s a false sensation of competition 
on the other 2 branches transmission and distribution; while on the 1
st
 its nearly 
inevitable the lack of competition, on the 2
nd
 the measures engaged by Poland’s 
energetic policy of consolidation dictates a status quo on the branch and a policy of 
non-aggression pact between the 4 majors. 
“The creation of the energy giants might have been a good idea in theory, assuming 
that they would compete with each other on the domestic market (…)” (Nowak, B., 
2009) 
The gas sector isn’t much different from the electricity; although the unbundling is 
completed, the influence of PGNIG is still felt vertically on the sector. This situation 
disrupts the market and puts Poland on a delicate situation that requires a balanced 
approach both to the European Union and on the other hand to Russia. A game of 
geopolitics is what is at stake on the gas sector so, despite Poland “mistakes” it is almost 
impossible to recriminate the country for wanting to keep a strong hand and influence 
on the market. 
Renewable energy sources still continue to be the “Achilles’ heel” of Poland energetic 
policy; being a country heavily dependent on fossil fuels with emphasis on coal, Poland 
only obliges to the RES initiative mostly due to imposition of the European Union and 
its environmental goals. Despite it, there is a significant improvement from the post-
2004 to today and the expectation is for it to keep growing alongside other measures 
and investments (example of nuclear). Overall, the objective of diversifying the country 
energy sources is being accomplished. 
Europe’s current situation allows Poland to push forward one of its more substantial 
agendas inside the European community; the current and unfortunate situation of 
Ukraine provides Poland with a policy window to advocate for a more integrated 
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European energy market that will be able to cope with Russia and its attempts to 
“blackmail” and handicap the gas market. One of the idea enthusiasts is Donald Tusk, 
former Polish prime-minister and currently at the helm of the European Commission 
that on April of 2014 wrote to Financial Times an article entitled “A united Europe can 
end Russia’s energy stranglehold” on which he advocated: 
“Regardless of how the stand-off over Ukraine develops, one lesson is clear: excessive 
dependence on Russian energy makes Europe weak (…) I therefore propose an energy 
union. It will return the European project to its roots.” (Financial Times, 2014)  
Being at the forefront of this project, Poland will have to assume on the comings years 
its place as a regional leader in Europe, not only because it will be one of the countries 
that will benefit the most from it but also because historically it can be the place of 
converge between the West and the East, the big and the small countries that will be 
together for a single cause. 
Following this dissertation, our future work will be done in Poland where the author has 
already signed a job contract and hope to upgrade his local knowledge on energy and 
sustainability policy. 
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7. – Annex 
Figure 1: GDP growth (%) since 1990 
 
Source: [World Bank (World Development Indicators), 2015] 
 
Figure 3: Energy dependence of all energetic sources (total %) 
 
Source: [Eurostat, 2015] 
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Figure 4: Share of RES on gross energy consumption (%) 
 
Source: [Eurostat, 2015] 
 
Figure 5: Poland annual electricity imports (GWh) 
 
Source: [Eurostat, 2015] 
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Figure 6: Poland electricity prices per type of user 
 
Source: [Eurostat, 2015] 
 
Figure 7: Poland electricity DSO’s activity areas 
 
Source: [ERO (Energy Regulatory Office), National Activity Report 2014] 
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Figure 8: Price of Russian gas paid by European countries in 2013 (US$) 
 
Source: [Several sources (retrieved from: http://www.rferl.org/content/russian-gas-
how-much-gazprom/25442003.html and last accessed on September 10, 2015)] 
 
Figure 10: Poland wind farm locations and best spots for their implementation 
 
Source: [Several sources (retrieved from: 
http://www.thewindpower.net/country_maps_en_27_poland.php and 
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http://www.mae.com.pl/odnawialne-zrodla-energii-energia-wiatru.html, both last 
accessed on September 10, 2015)] 
Figure 11: Poland Hydroelectric plants locations 
 
Source: [Retrieved online from: http://gramwzielone.pl/mapa-instalacji-
oze/elektrownia-wodna and last accessed on September 10, 2015] 
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Table 3: Electricity losses since production to the final consumer (calculated based 
on Table 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Table 6: Gazprom exports of Natural Gas to Poland, Czech Republic and 
Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: [Factbook “Gazprom in figures 2010-2014] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Loss % (2004) Loss % (2013) 
Poland 32,10 24,61 
Cz 36,17 34,89 
Germany 15,58 18,17 
UK 13,87 11,61 
EU - 28 16,81 15,07 
Gazprom gas sales (Bcm) 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Poland 11.8 10.3 13.1 12.9 9.1 
Czech Rep. 9 8.2 8.3 7.9 0.8 
Germany 35.3 34.1 34 41 40.3 
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Table 7: Demand of RES from gross energy consumption (ktoe) 
 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Wind 22.0 174.0 631.9 1 178.4 1 470.0 1 530.0 
Biomass 159.2 298.5 503.2 892.3 953 994.9 
Hydro 175.6 211 240.3 271.4 276.7 276.7 
Biogas 13.8 31.4 140.7 344.5 555.6 592.6 
Total 370.6 715.0 1 516.1 2 686.6 3 256.3 3 396.3 
Source: [National Renewable Energy Plan, 2010] 
 
Table 8: Number of wind farms in Poland by capacity 
Capacity <= 5MW Capacity >5MW 
74 114 
Source: [Retrieved online from: 
http://www.thewindpower.net/country_windfarms_en_27_poland.php and last accessed 
on September 10, 2015] 
 
Table 9: Percentage of land in Poland covered with forest 
Years 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 
% 30.7 30.8 30.8 
Source: [World Bank (World Development Indicators), 2015] 
 
Table 10: Biomass energy sources in Poland 
Year 2015 2020 
Forestry  2002 2081 
Agriculture 1763 2929 
Waste 1151 1758 
Source: [National Renewable Energy Plan, 2010] 
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Table 11: Percentage of area of Poland that can be used to agriculture 
Years 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 
% 48 48.6 47.4 
Source: [World Bank (World Development Indicators), 2015] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
